BBC Focus Magazine

[MikeG]

This has to be the most irresponsible research I have ever heard being undertaken.

Scientists who created easier-to-spread versions of the deadly bird flu said Friday they are temporarily halting more research, as international specialists debate what should happen next.

[url]
http://news.yahoo.com/scientists-pause- ... 27188.html[/url]

[Shadowwolf]

It's not really that irresponsible when you consider why they are doing it, which is more than just s**ts 'n' giggles. Their reason as they put in an open letter yesterday was, ""More research is needed to determine how influenza viruses in nature become human pandemic threats," the statement says, "so that they can be contained before they acquire the ability to transmit from human to human, or so that appropriate countermeasures can be deployed if adaptation to humans occurs." Taken from here.

Also remember that they are engaging in a moratorium and seeking a way to disseminate the research in a controlled and responsible manner to try and avoid any information ending up in the wrong hands. If they were being irresponsible and cavalier then they would probably ignore all these concerns and carry on regardless.

To be honest I'm also not sure how much of a risk the info would be unless the modification of the virus is stupidly easy. It is not as if terrorists are possessing sophisticated laboratories in which to work and develop their own versions and weaponise them, especially when there are easier alternatives.

[MikeG]

According to someone called Murphy, if there is even the slightest possibility of an accident happening, it will. The reassurances that the details of the experiments will only be released to legitimate scientists don't mean much either, who's to say that they can't be kidnapped or bribed? Or their systems hacked?

The U.S. government funded the work but last month urged the teams not to publicly reveal the exact formula so that would-be bioterrorists couldn't copy it. Critics also worried a lab accident might allow the strains to escape. The researchers reluctantly agreed not to publish all the details as long as the government set up a system to provide them to legitimate scientists who really need to know. The National Institutes of Health is creating such a system.
"We recognize that we and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks," ......

The last sentence where they speak of "minimizing risk" is the key phrase in the entire article for me.

[Healerman]

The research that has led to these two strains of super H5N1 being created is supposed to be looking at how a freely communicable bird flu virus may arise, how easily this might happen and what the changes might be that could possibly also provide a weakness in the virus that might be exploited.

IMHO it might have been a very good idea to first develop a broadly normal but non-lethal variation of H5N1 upon which to carry out these experiments. In their current form, if they get out, or are re-engineered by bioterrorists, the potential death toll, given this virus' nature, could top 5 billion.

I know that "Health & Safety" gets a lot of scorn poured on it, but the "severity of outcome" in this case is ridiculously high and the "probability of occurence"? Well it's back to Mr Murphy.

With Totally Resistant TB now going large in India, I think we've already created* enough problems of infectious disease, we don't need more.

*Overuse/innapropriate use of antibiotics

[Shadowwolf]

The reassurances that the details of the experiments will only be released to legitimate scientists don't mean much either, who's to say that they can't be kidnapped or bribed? Or their systems hacked?

Could that not be said about anything?

By that rationale nothing of potential danger would be researched - except by unscrupulous scientists - lest by some unfortunate turn of events it might be, stolen, sold for profit and misused in some manner.

[Shadowwolf]

*Overuse/innapropriate use of antibiotics

That's a real and problematic side effect of over-prescribing but not really a research issue.

[MikeG]

By that rationale nothing of potential danger would be researched

Research into H5N1 is definitely a beneficial field. However, rather than researching how easily the virus could mutate into a more contagious form, I would prefer to see research into more effective treatments in the event that it did become contagious. In the former case, the danger of a disaster is quite high vis-a-vis the benefits. In the latter, we would have developed defenses in the event that a natural mutation occurs. I believe that research for research's sake, in cases when the stakes can be quite high, is not a good idea.

If the scientists do eventually succeed, it will only show other rogue states (like North Korea for instance) that a deadly strain is achievable. Who knows where this might lead?

[Shadowwolf]

I would prefer to see research into more effective treatments in the event that it did become contagious.

I do think that this is precisely why they are researching how easily it could change so as they can effectively cover as many bases as possible rather than focus on one strain but find their cure quickly outmaneuvered. It is overall relevant research to neutralising the virus and not merely research for the sake of research.

If the scientists do eventually succeed, it will only show other rogue states (like North Korea for instance) that a deadly strain is achievable. Who knows where this might lead?

Honestly it would likely be nowhere, there are already sufficient and easily obtainable bio-weapons pathogens already existing and little need of researching more. Besides which, researching your pathogen can be the easy bit, weaponising it not so easy as it requires quite a tough pathogen to survive effective delivery systems that spread an active agent over a large area. You could use suicide carriers of a contagious agent but that's very slow and your pathogen must also be necessarily slow which is why ebola is of little use in bio-weapons. Now it's one thing to strap some explosives on and rush in, very quick way out that is but a slow, painful disease, hard to get volunteers I would think. Anyhoo, slow acting and suicide carriers means a poor battlefield weapon and one mostly aimed at a civilian population. Then there is the taboo aspect, the particularly despicable nature of bio-weapons, the almost universal abhorrence of such devices. Any large-scale deployment of bio-weapons - particularly by a nation state - will be answered by a nuclear retaliation, nuclear armed states are quite clear about this and given such a reward is why no one I'm aware of bothers - at least openly - with bio-weapons. The DPRK does have a nuke program mind.

[Liam Sheppard]

they have to be one step ahead! so they can get a vaccine ready